
THE FRAGMENTS 



OP 



• '\& 



PA 



Translated into English Hexameters, 



INTRODUCTION AND NOTES, 



THOMAS DAVIDSON. 






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' I P. ROESLEIN. 

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THE EEAGMENTS OP 



PAEIENIDES. 

Translated into English Hexameters, 

WITH INTRODUCTION AND NOTES,. 

B Y 

Tiiomas Davidson. 



HISTOEICAL. 



The Eleatic school of Philosophy is mainly represented by four- 
names : Xenophanes, Parmenides, Melissos, and Zeno. Though the 
first of these is universally regarded as the founder of the school, Par- 
menides is the most important figure in it, the Eleatic par excellence. 
His father's name was Pyrrhes. He himself was a native of Elea or 
Velia. This city, which was of small importance politically, was 
founded about B. C. 540 by a colony of Phokaeans. It lay on the west- 
ern shore of Lucania. 

The date of Parmenides' birth is uncertain; but we shall hardly 
be wrong in placing it in the last quarter of the sixth century B. C. 
Diogenes Laertius says he flourished about the sixty-ninth Olympiad 
(B. C. 504-501); but this can hardly be true, if any confidence is to 
be placed in the statements of Plato. In the dialogue entitled Par- 
menides we read: "Antiphon stated on the authority of Pythodoros 
that Zeno and Parmenides once came to the greater Panathemea 
Parmenides being at that time quite an old man with grey hair and a 
handsome and noble countenance, and certainly not over sixty-five- 
years of age; Zeno about forty years old, tall and elegant, , said to 
have been the favorite of Parmenides; He mentioned also that they 
put up at the house of Pythodoros in the Kerameikos, outside the city 
walls, and that Sokrates and many other persons visited them there, 
desiring to hear Zeno read his productions, which had then been 
brought by them for the first time, and that Sokrates was then a very 
young man." In the Sophist, Sokrates is made to say: "I was present 
when Parmenides uttered and discussed words of exceeding beauty, I 
being then a young man, and he already far advanced in years."' 



/ 



2 Parmenides. 

Again, in the Theaitetos, he Bays : u For I was personally acquainted 
with the mat), I being very young, and he very old." Supposing Sok- 
rates, who was born about B. G. 469, to have been fifteen yeai's old 
when he conversed with Parmenides, this would place tbis meeting in 
454 B. C, and the birth of Parmenides in 519. This tallies exactly 
with the statement of Diogenes that Zeno, who, according to Plato, 
was twenty-five years younger than Parmenides, flourished about the 
seventy-ninth Olympiad, 454-451 B. C. Mr. Grote's opinion, which 
is not much at variance with this, is worth quoting in his own words : 

" It will hardly be proper to place the conversation between Par- 
menides and Sokrates — as Mr. Clinton places it, Fast. H. vol. ii. App. 
c. 21, p. 364 — at a time when Sokrates was only fifteen years of age. 
The ideas which the ancients had about youthful propriety would not 
permit him to take part in conversation with an eminent philosopher 
at so early an age as fifteen, when he would not yet be entered on the 
roll of citizens, or be qualified for the smallest function, military or 
civil. I cannot but think that Sokrates must have been more than 
twenty years of age when he thus conversed with Parmenides. 

"Sokrates was born in 469 (perhaps 468) B. C. ; he would therefore 
be twenty years of age in 449 ; assuming the visit of Parmenides to 
Athens to have been in 448 B. C, since he was then sixty-five years of 
age, he would be born in 513 B. C. It is objected that, if this date be 
admitted, Parmenides could not have been a pupil of Xenophanes : we 
should thus be compelled to admit, which perhaps is the truth, that he 
learned the doctrine of Xenophanes at second-hand/' 

Theophrastos informs us that Parmenides was a pupil of Anaximan- 
der ; but this can hardly be true, if as Diogenes asserts, on the author- 
ity of Apollodoros, Anaximander died in the fifty-eighth Olympiad 
(548-545 B. C), several years before the founding of Elea. That 
Parmenides may have been acquainted with some of the teachings of 
Anaximander seems not unlikely. The latter had declared the Infinite 
to be the first principle of all things, a doctrine which it seems to be 
the intention of Parmenides pointedly to refute and disclaim when he 
says: 

"Wherefore that that which is should be infinite, is not permitted." 

It was currently reported in Aristotle's time that Parmenides was a 
pupil of Xenophanes, and we have every reason to believe that he was. 
We learn also that he was intimate with several Pythagoreans, two of 
whom, Ameinias and Diochsetes, are mentioned. He is said to have 
admired them greatly, to have adopted to a considerable extent their 
mode of life, and to have erected a JSeroon to the memory of Dio- 
chsetes. 




Parmenides. 3 

Parmenides was no mere dreamer. Like Empedokles and others, 
he took an active part in the public affairs of his native city, and drew 
up a code of laws, to which the Eleans every year swore to conform. 
He was the friend of Empedokles and Leukippos, and the teacher of 
Melissos and Zeno. He disseminated his philosophy not only by his 
writings, but also, as we have seen, by public lectures and discussions. 
He employed in his discussions the Dialectic method of reasoning 
which had been invented by Xenophanes, and was afterwards so much 
improved and used by Zeno as to be considered his invention. We are 
not aware that Parmenides left any prose writings. Like most of the 
contemporary philosophers, he committed his teachings to verse and 
indeed, if we may believe Proklos and Cicero, was not very successful 
in so doing. The former says his diction was more like prose than 
poetry, and the latter that his verses were inferior, but the matter of 
them sometimes pretty forcible ; which we can believe. 

The only work of Parmenides known to the ancients, and probably 
the only one he, ever composed, was the poem entitled On Nature 
whereof considerable fragments have come down to us — preserved 
mainly in the works of Plato, Sextus Empeiricus, Proklos, and Simpli- 
cius. The ancients regarded the poem as divided into two parts, the 
one On Truth or On the Intelligible, the other On Opinion or On the 
Perceptible. The latter is called by Plutarch a Cosmogony, and not 
without reason, for in it Parmenides seems to have attempted, without 
denying the existence of the gods, to explain them upon physical prin- 
ciples. In what esteem this poem was held by the ancients we may 
learn from the writings of Plato and Aristotle, as well as from many 
later productions. Much that is put into the mouth of Parmenides in 
the Platonic dialogue which bears his name, we must ascribe to Plato 
himself, or to whoever was the author. This dialogue, which accord- 
ing to Hegel contains "the sublimest dialectic that ever was," is held 
by some critics not to be from the pen of Plato. 

The following translation is made from the Fragments as they stand 
in Mullach's Fragmenta Philosophorum Grmcorum, Paris, Didot. 
Though I have adopted his arrangement, I have not in all cases adopted 
his readings, which are, in one or two instances, I think, very inconsid- 
erate. 1 have used every effort to make the translation literal, and I 
think it will be found to be so. As to my verses, I may plead that, if 
Parmenides was unable to write his Philosophy in good Greek hexam- 
eters, I may be excused for not being able to translate them into good 
English ones. In the notes, I have brought together all the valuable 
information I have been able to and regarding the different parts of 
the work of Parmenides. 



4 Parmenides. 

ON NATURE. 

I. Introduction.! 

Soon as the coursers 2 that bear me and drew me as far as extendeth 

Impulse, guided me and threw me aloft in the glorious pathway, 

Up to the Goddess 3 that guide th through all things man that is conscious, 

There was I carried along, for there did the coursers sagacious, 

Drawing the chariot, bear me, and virgins preceded to guide them — 

Daughters of Helios* leaving behind them the mansions of darkness — 

Into the light, with their strong hands forcing asunder the night-shrouds, 

While in its sockets the axle 5 emitted the sound of a syrinx, 

Glowing, for still it was urged by a couple of wheels well-rounded, 

One upon this side, one upon that, when it hastened its motion. 

There were the gates of the paths of the Night and the paths of the Day-time. 

Under the gates is a threshhold of stone and above is a lintel. 

These too are closed in the ether with great doors guarded by Justice 6 — 

Justice the mighty avenger, that keepeth the keys of requital. 

Her did the virgins address, and with soft words deftly persuaded, 

Swiftly for them to withdraw from the gates the bolt and its fastener. 

Opening wide, they uncovered the yawning expanse of the portal, 

Backward rolling successive the hinges of brass in their sockets, — 

Hinges constructed with nails and with clasps; then onward the virgins 

Straightway guided their steeds and their chariot over the highway. 

Then did the goddess 7 receive me with gladness, and taking my right hand 

Into her own, thus uttered a word and kindly bespake me : 

" Youth that art mated with charioteers and companions immortal, 
Coming to us on the coursers that bear thee, to visit our mansion, 
Hail ! for it is not an evil Award that hath guided thee hither, 
Into this path— for, I ween, it is far from the pathway of mortals — 
Nay, it is Justice and Eight. Thou needs must have knowledge of all things, 
Firsts of the Truth's unwavering heart that is fraught with conviction, 
Then of the notions of mortals, where no true conviction abideth, 
But thou shalt surely be taught this too, that every opinion 
Needs must pass through a the All, and vanquish the test with approval. 1 

II. On Truth. 11 

"Listen, and I will instruct thee— and thou, when thou hearest, shalt ponder- 
What are the sole two paths of research that are open to thinking. 
One path is: That Being doth be, and Non-Being is not: 
This is the way of Conviction, for Truth follows hard in her footsteps. 
Th' other path is: That Being is not, and Non-Being must be; 



Parmenides. 

This one, I tell thee in truth, is an all-incredible pathway. 

For thou never canst know what is not (for none can conceive it), 

Nor canst thou give it expression, for one thing are Thinking and Being. 

* * * * * * * * 

" And to me 'tis indifferent 

Whence I begin, for thither again thou shalt find me returning. 1 2 

******** 
Speaking and thinking must needs be existent, for is is of Being. 
Nothing must needs not be; these things I enjoin thee to ponder. 
Foremost of all withdraw thy mind from this path of inquiry, 
Then likewise from that other, wherein men, empty of knowledge, 
Wander forever uncertain, while Doubt and Perplexity guide them — 
Guide in their bosoms the wandering mind ; and onward they hurry, 
Deaf and dumb and blind and stupid, unreasoning cattle — 
Herds that are wont to think Being and Non-Being one and the self-same, 1 3 
Yet not one and the same; and that all things move in a circle. 

******** 
Never I ween shalt thou learn that Being can be of what is not; 
Wherefore do thou withdraw thy mind from this path of inquiry, 
Neither let habit compel thee, while treading this pathway of knowledge, 
Still to employ a visionless eye or an ear full of ringing, 
Yea, or a clamorous tongue; but prove this vext demonstration 
Uttered by me, by reason. And now there remains for discussion 
One path only : That Being doth be — and on it there are tokens, 
_Jtfany and many to show that what is is birthless and deathless, 
-Whole and only-begotten, and moveless and ever-enduring: 
Never it was or shall be; but the all simultaneously now is,i * 
One continuous one ; for of it what birth shalt thou search for? 
How and whence it hath sprung? I shall not permit thee to tell me, 
Neither to think: ' Of what is not,' for none can say or imagine 
How Not-Is becomes Is ; or else what need should have stirred it, 
After or yet before its beginning, to issue from nothing? , 
Thus either wholly Being must be or wholly must not be. 
Never from that which is will the force of Intelligence suffer 
Aught to become beyond being itself. Thence neither production 
Neither destruction doth Justice permit, ne'er slackening her fetters; 
But she forbids. And herein is contained the decision of these things ; 
Either there is or is not; but Judgment declares, as it needs must, 
One of these paths to be uncomprehended and utterly nameless, 
No true pathway at all, but the other to be and be real. 
How can that which is now be hereafter, or how can it have been? 
For if it hath been before, or shall be hereafter, it is not: 



C Parmenides. 

Thus generation is quenched and decay surpasseth believing. 
Nor is there aught of distinct; for the All is self-similar ahvay. 
Nor is there anywhere more to debar it from being unbroken ; 
Nor is there anywhere less, for the All is sated with Being; 
Wherefore the All is unbroken, and Being approacheth to Being. 
Moveless, moreover, and bounded by great chains' limits itlieth, 
Void of beginning, without any ceasing, since birth and destruction 
Both have wandered afar, driven forth by the truth of conviction. 
Same in the same and abiding, and self through itself it reposes. 
Steadfast thus it endureth, for mighty Necessity holds it — 
Holds it within the chains of her bounds and round doth secure it. 
Wherefore that that which is should be infinite is not permitted ; * 5 
For it is lacking in naught, or else it were lacking in all things. 

* * -x- * -x- * * * 

Steadfastly yet in thy spirit regard things absent as present; 
Surely thon shalt not separate Being from clinging to Being, 
Nor shalt thou find it scattered at all through the All of the Cosmos, 
Nor yet gathered together. 

•x- * * * * * * * 

One and the same are thought and that whereby there is thinking; 1 6 
^ever apart from existence, wherein it receiveth expression, 
Shalt thou discover the action of thinking; for naught is or shall be 
Other besides or beyond the Existent; for Fate hath determined 
That to be lonely and moveless, which all things are but a name for — 
Things that men hare set up for themselves, believing as real 
Birth and decay, becoming and ceasing, to be and to not-be, 
Movement from place to place, and change from color to color. 
But since the uttermost limit of Being is ended and perfect, 
Then it is like to the bulk of a sphere well-rounded on all sides,! 7 
Everywhere distant alike from the centre; for never there can be 
Anything greater or anything less, on this side or that side ; 
Yea, there is neither a non-existent to bar it from coming 
Into equality, neither can Being be different from Being. 
More of it here, less there, for the All is inviolate ever. 
Therefore, I ween, it lies equally stretched in its limits on all sides. 
And with this will I finish the faithful discourse and the thinking 
Touching the truth, and now thou shalt learn the notions of mortals. 
Learn and list to the treach'rous array of the words I shall utter. 

in. On Opinion. is 

"Men have set up for themselves twin shapes to be named by Opinion, 
(One they cannot set up, and herein do they wander in error,) 
And they have made them distinct in their nature, and marked them with tokens, 



Parmenides. 1 

Opposite each unto each— the one, flame's fire of the ether, 
Gentle, exceedingly thin, and everywhere one and the self-same, 
But not the same with the other; the other, self-similar likewise, 
Standing opposed by itself, brute might, dense nature and heavy. 
All the apparent system of these will I open before thee, 
So that not any opinion of mortals shall ever elude thee. 

* * * * ###* 
All things now being marked with the names of light and of darkness, 
Yea, set apart by the various powers of the one or the other, 

Surely the All is at once full of light and invisible darkness, 

Both being equal, and naught being common to one with the other. 

* * * -x- * * * * 
For out of formless fire are woven the narrower circlets, ' 9 

Those over these out of night; but a portion of flame shooteth through them. 
And in the centre of all is the Goddess that governeth all things : 
She unto all is the author of loathsome birth and coition, 
Causing the female to mix with the male, and by mutual impulse 
Likewise the male with the female. 

* tt -X- * * *## 

Foremost of gods, she gave birth unto Love; yea, foremost of all gods. 2 
*** # * *** 

Then thou shalt know the ethereal nature and each of its tokens — 
Each of the signs in the ether, and all the invisible workings 
Wrought by the blemishless sun's pure lamp, and whence they have risen* 
Then thou shalt hear of the orb-eyed moon's circumambient workings, 
And of her nature, and likewise discern the heaven that surrounds them, 
Whence it arose, and how by her sway Necessity bound it, 
Firm, to-encircle the bounds of the stars. 

##* * * #** 

" How the earth and the sun, and the moon, and the ether 
Common to all, and the milk of the sky, and the peak of Olympus, 
Yea, and the fervent might of the stars, were impelled into being. 

*** * * #*# 

Circling the earth, with its wanderings, a borrowed, a night-gleaming splendor. 

* ■& # # * #•*# 
Wistfully watching forever, with gaze turned towards the sun-light. 

*## * * **• 

Even as in each one of men is a union of limbs many-jointed. 
So there is also in each one a mind; for one and the same are 
That which is wise and the nature generic of members in mortals, 
Yea, unto each and to all ; for that which prevaileth is thinking. 2 1 

* * * * * * * * 



8 Parmenides. 

Here on the right hand the youths, and there on the left hand the maidens. 2 2 

Thus by the strength of opinion were these created and now are, 
Yea, and will perish hereafter, as soon as they grow unto ripeness; 
Men have imposed upon each one of these a name as a token." 

NOTES. 

1. This introduction has generally been looked upon as allegorical. 
In one sense it is so ; at the same time we must not forget that what 
in its own day was the soberest statement of facts that could be made, 
frequently appears to succeeding ages as allegorical. Primitive peo- 
ples found it far easier to embody new thoughts and feelings in the 
concrete forms of their mythology, with which they were familiar, 
than to describe them in abstract terms. If we find Parmenides say- 
ing that he was borne aloft by horses to the presence of the Goddess 
who governs all things, we must not forget that our own language is 
not altogether free from allegory, when we say that he "rose to higher 
regions of thought." Parmenides did not mean to make an allegory; 
he simply gave an account of his mental progress in the ordinary my- 
thological dialect of his time, and that, from our point of view, seems 
allegorical. 

2. If we compare the opening of this with a passage in the fifth book 
of the Iliad, where Here and Athene visit Zeus in their chariot, we 
cannot fail to be struck with the similarity of the two. "And Here 
touched the steeds sharply with the whip, and, of their own accord, 
the gates of the sky, kept by the JTorce, to whom are entrusted the 
wide sky, and Olympus, to fold back the dense cloud, and to replace it, 
burst open. And through these they guided their goaded steeds, and 
found the son of Kronos sitting afar from the other gods on the sum- 
mit of many-peaked Olympus." We need not be very\ansious to de- 
termine precisely what Parmenides meant by coursers or by chariot. 
Imaginations capable of furnishing the sun with a chariot for his daily 
course might surely be pardoned for giving the soul one, when it 
ascends into the pure ether of thought, without our supposing that it 
must represent the appetites or anything else in particular. A chariot 
was the recognized means of rising aloft, not only among the Greeks 
but also among the ancient Indians, the Hebrews (witness the story 
of Elijah), and other nations. That Parmenides, when his mind was 
expanding, and, as it were, grasping the whole Universe in one 
thought, should have felt that he was coming into the region of the 
gods, and pictured himself as furnished with their means of locomo- 
tion, one can readily believe. If this is once t admitted, we need not 
spend much labor in attempting 10 interpret minute points about the 



Parmenides. 9 

chariot or its axles. Sextus Empeiricus, in whose work Adversus Ma- 
thematicos this introduction is for the most part preserved, makes a 
comment upon it, which we must take for what it is worth. Sextus 
lived at a time when philosophers were finding allegories in everything 
ancient ; witness his contemporary Porphyry's Cave of the Nymphs. 
His views of what Parmenides may have thought, and his ideas con- 
cerning the imagery likely to have suggested itself to Parmenides, can 
have no authority whatever. He says : "In these lines, Parmenides 
says he is borne by coursers — that is, the irrational impulses and appe- 
tites of the soul — along the noble and glorious pathway of a goddess — 
that is, the path of contemplation based on philosophic reason. For 
reason, like a guiding deity, conducts to the knowledge of all things. 
And her daughters go before — namely, the senses. He refers to the 
ears when he says : 'It was urged by a couple of wheels well-rounded' 
by the wheels (circles), that is, of the ears, through which they receive 
sound. Intuitions he calls l daughters of the Sun,' who leave the 
'mansions of darkness/ and move [their veils] toward the light, be- 
cause without light there would be no use for them. He says he came 
to Bike or avenging Justice, ' who keepeth the keys of requital,' that 
is, to thought, which has the sure and steadfast comprehensions of 
things. She, having received him, promises to teach him two things, 

' First of the Truth's unwavering heart that is fraught with persuasion,' 

that is, the unswerving step of science ', 

'Then of the notions of mortals, where no true conviction abideth,' 

that is, whatever is matter of opinion, as being, for that reason, uncer- 
tain. In the end she makes the clear declaration, that the senses are 
not to be trusted, but only the reason. She says : 

' Neither let habit compel thee, while treacling this pathway of knowledge, 
Still to employ a visionless eye, or an ear full of ringing, 
Yea, or a clamorous tongue 5 but try this vext demonstration 
Uttered by me, by Reason. ' 

From this it is plain that he (Parmenides) also, in pronouncing the 
scientific reason to be the canon of truth in regard to the things that 
are (in matters of ontology), revolted against the authority of the 
senses." 

3. (See note 7.) 

4. The daughters of the Sun, in the mythological account, were 
yEgle, Lampetie, and Phaethousa — Eadiance, Sheen, and Gleam. The 
allegory here is very simple. Pindar calls the sun's ray the " Far- 
seeing mother of the eyes," and the sun himself the "Birth-giving 
father of the sharp rays," and the "Lord of the fire-breathing steeds." 
Preller, in his Griechische Mythologie, says: "From his radiant light 



10 Parmenides. 

ITolios is called Phaothon, and also the glittering eye of Heaven or of 
Zeus ; because the eye is the light of the body, and has therefore, in 
all times, been used as an expression for all the radiant and gleaming 
phenomena of the sky. For the same reason Helios is the all-seeing 
(7rayo7rr7jc), all-observing, all-investigating, the general spy of gods and 
men, to whom nothing is hidden or secret. * * * He is likewise 
a god of the truth of all that is concealed, a god who was wont to be 
invoked in oaths and by oppressed innocence. Prom this, the further 
transition to the principle of wisdom and cognition was easy ; and, in 
this sense, Parmenides, in the opening of his philosophico-didactic 
poem, tells us that he rose to the heights of knowledge riding in the 
chariot of the sun, and guided by the daughters of Helios ; while 
Pindar, in a very beautiful poem, composed on the occasion of a solar 
eclipse, had called the ray of the sun the "mother of the eyes, and the 
fountain of wisdom." Passages might be quoted from the tragedians 
to show that the sun was considered the source of sight and blindness, 
e.g. Eurip. Hekabe, 1066-8; Soph. 0. C. 869. 

5. The chariot of the sun is not mentioned in Homer. It is first 
noticed in the so-called Homeric Hymn to Helios. No particular 
meaning is to be attached to the axles or wheels ; they are mentioned 
simply to show the ease and rapidity of the motion. 

6. In the passage quoted from Homer in note 2, we learn that the 
gates of the sky were kept by the Soros. The names of these, accord- 
ing to Hesiod, are Eunomia, Dike, and Eirene — Order, Justice, and 
Peace. Thus Parmenides, in making Justice the guardian of the gates 
of the sky, adheres to the ordinary mythology. We learn also from 
Hesiod — Works and Days, 254 sq. — that Justice was greatly revered 
by the Olympian gods, standing in very close relation to Zeus, and 
keeping watch for him over the transgressions of men. The Horse, it 
must be remembered, are the daughters of Zeus and Themis (Eight). 
"We need not be astonished at the materials of which the gates are said 
to be made. Even Homer speaks of the heaven as "brazen," "all- 
brazen/' and "iron." 

7. The Goddess (0ed) here meant is evidently the same as the one 
referred to in line 3, and there called Aaqnov. Patter, in his History of 
Philosophy, misled perhaps by Sextus Empeiricus, supposes Dike to be 
meant. But this is evidently wrong; for Dike is merely the gate- 
keeper in the mansion of a higher power. Mullach sees this and cor- 
rects Eitter, but is nearly as far wrong himself when he affirms that 
the goddess meant is Wisdom. There are two things particularly to 
be remarked in regard to the personages mentioned in this poem ; — 
first, their names are always significant; second, not one of them is a 
personification made by the poet himself, but all are taken from the 



Parmenides. 11 

already existing mythology. There is no mention of Zeus, or Athene, 
or Apollo, or any of the Olympians, neither do we meet with any mere 
abstract term personified. I cannot find any proof that the Greeks 
ever personified Wisdom. Pindar, indeed, in his poem On a Solar 
Eclipse, speaks of "the path of Wisdom/' and 1 doubt not but similar 
expressions might be found elsewhere; still this does not amount to 
a personification of Wisdom. If we observe carefully, we shall, I 
think, be able to discover the name of the goddess meant. In lines 
26, 27, we are informed that it was not an evil fate (Mot pa) that had 
brought the philosopher to the goddess, but that it was Justice and 
Right (Themis). Now we know already what part Justice (Dike) 
has taken in bringing him thither; but, so far as we know, Themis 
has done nothing towards it. Now we know in regaid to Themis 
that she stood in very close relation to Zeus (Odyssey II. 68); that she 
was by some held to be the eldest of the gods ; that iEschylus consid- 
ered her identical with Gaia (Earth); that she was the goddess of law 
and order; that she was endowed with knowledge of the future, and that 
the Delphic oracle belonged to her. before it passed over to Apollo. 
Pindar tells us, that "First the Fates bore the well-counselled, celes- 
tial Themis in their golden chariot from the springs of Ocean to the 
awful slope of Olympus, along the shining path, to be the time-honored 
spouse of Zeus the Saviour." The Fates, who led Themis to Olym- 
pus, are daughters of Night, whereas the guides of Parmenides are the 
daughters of the Sun ; this fact would almost seem to throw light upon 
line 7. However this may be, if we consider all the attributes and the 
lofty position of Themis, we shall probably be convinced that she is 
the goddess referred to by Parmenides. If this be true, Parmenides 
may be supposed to have meant that insight led him to justice or right 
action, from which he passed to the mother or source of justice, which 
explained everything to him. 

8. The goddess here mentions two paths, and, a few lines farther on, 
adds that they are the only ones open to thinking. In line 45, she 
mentions another path, which however is not open to thinking, being 
trod only by "unreasoning cattle. " 

9. This line I have translated in a manner entirely different from 
that of any of the editors of the Fragments. In doing so, I have re- 
jected Mullach's entirely unauthorized reading, and retained that of one 
of the best MSS. I understand the line to mean, that every concept 
which sets itself up as the first principle must be tested by being made 
universal. If it can stand without any presuppositions, then it is the 
"True First Principle"; if it does not, it must be rejected. (See Jour, 
of Spec. Phil., Vol. III., No. 3, p. 288.) 

10. Some space has been devoted to elucidating this Introduction, 



1 2 Parmenides. 

because the interpretation put upon it by Sextus Empeiricus has gene- 
rally been accepted as the true one. 

11. The goddess now begins her discourse on Truth, the burden of 
which is that is is the universal predicate, and that there is no not-is. 
She warns her hearer to avoid believing the opposite doctrine. She 
sustains the true one by the argument that nothing can be thought or 
affirmed of that which has no being, and thence arrives at the famous 
conclusion that being and thinking are identical. Plotinus remarks 
upon this passage: "Previously (to Plato) Parmenides likewise touched 
upon this view, inasmuch as he reduced Being and mind to the same 
thing, and affirmed that mind did not lie in the objects of sensation. 
For when he says that to think and to be are the same thing, he says 
that this is immovable, and, although he attributes to it the power of 
thinking, he deprives it of all corporeal movement in order that it may 
remain unchanged, and likens it to the bulk of a sphere because it holds 
and comprehends everything, and because thinking is not outside but 
inside of itself." (Enneads, Y. 1, 8.) 

12. Proklos's interpretation of these lines runs thus : "For Parmeni- 
des saw Being itself (as has been said before), that which is abstracted 
from all things, and the highest of things that are, that wherein the 
existent was primarily manifested : not that he ignored the multipli- 
city of objects of intelligence; for it was he who said, 'For Being ap- 
proaches to Being'; and again, 

' To me 'tis indifferent 
Whence I begin, for thither again thou shalt find me returning;' 

and elsewhere, 

' Everywhere distant alike from the centre' (line 103). 

By all these expressions he shows that he considers that the objects of 
intelligence are many, and that there is a hierarchy among them of 
first, and middle, and second, and an ineffable union y thus not ignoring 
the multiplicity of the things that are, but seeing that the whole of this 
multiplicity has proceeded from the one Being. For there is the foun- 
tain of Being, and the home thereof, and the hidden Being from which 
the things that are draw their unity." 

13. Plato, in a connection similar to this, says : "For these things 
are mere word-puzzles, and it is impossible to affirm in thought 
whether Being, or Non-Being, or both, or neither, belongs to any one 
of them." (Rep. V. 479, C.) Neither Parmenides nor Plato had an 
opportunity of reading Hegel's Logic, in which it is expressly affirmed 
that pure Being and pure Nothing are the same. 

14. Plato says : "For the was and the shall be are generated forms 
of time, although we inadvertently and wrongly apply them to the 



Parmenides. . 13 

eternal essence. For we say that it was, is, and shall be ; yet the is 
only belongs to it truly, whereas was and shall be are properly predi- 
cated of that generation which goes forward in time." (Tim. 37, E.) 
Compare The Sentences of Porphyry, Jour, of Spec. Phil., Vol. III., 
No. 1. The whole of this fragment bears a striking resemblance to 
one of the hymns in the tenth book of the Big-Yeda. The following 
translation of it is taken from Max Mtiller's History of Ancient San- 
skrit Literature, p. 546 : 

"Nor aught nor naught existed; yon bright sky 
Was not, nor heaven's broad woof outstretched above. 
What covered all? what sheltered? what concealed? 
Was it the water's fathomless abyss? 
There was not death — hence was there naught immortal, 
There was no confine betwixt day and night; 
The only One breathed breathless in itself, 
Other than it there nothing since has been. 
Darkness there was, and all at first was veiled 
In gloom profound — an ocean without light. 
The germ that still lay covered in the husk 
Burst forth, one nature, from the fervent heat. 
Then first came Love upon it, the new spring 
Of mind/ yea, poets in their hearts discerned, 
Pondering, this bond between created things 
And uncreated. Comes this spark from earth, 
Piercing and all-pervading, or from heaven? 
Then seeds were sown and mighty power arose — 
NatujjB below, and Power and Will above. 
WtuFknows the secret? who proclaimed it here, 
Whence, whence this manifold creation sprang? — 
The gods themselves came later into being. — 
Who knows from whence this great creation sprang? — 
He from whom all this great creation came, 
Whether his will created or was mute, 
The Most High Seer that is in highest heaven, 
He knows it — or, perchance, e'en he knows not." 

15. Aristotle seems to have this passage in view, when he says : 
"Parmenides seems to hold to the One of reason, and Melissos to the 
One of mattei*. Accordingly the former affirms that the One is finite, 
the latter that it is infinite." Simplicius put the argument of Par- 
menides in a syllogistic form. "If Being is, and not Non-Being, it 
must be free from deficiency : but, being free from deficiency, it is per- 
fect; and being perfect, it must have an end, and is therefore not end« 
less. Having an end, it has a limit and a boundary." It is impos- 
sible to render into English the word-quibble on riXoq and ziXecov to 
which Simplicius here condescends. 

16. This is a very clear statement of the doctrine promulgated by 
Spinoza — the Parmenides of modern philosophy. Hegel (History of 



14 Parmenides. 

Philosophy, Vol. III., p. 372) says: "The simple thought of the ideal- 
ism of Spinoza is : what is true is simply and solely the one substance 
whose attributes are thinking and extension (Nature) : and this abso- 
lute unity alone is actual, is the actuality — it alone is God" (p. 376). 
"This, in general terms, is the Spinozan idea. It is the same as the 
$v of the Eleatics. It is the oriental view, which Spinoza was the first 
to utter in the "West. In general, we may remark that thought had of 
necessity to occupy the standpoint of Spinozism; that is the true 
beginning of all philosophy. If one begins to philosophize, ho must 
begin by being a Spinozist. The soul must bathe in this ether of the 
one substance, wherein all that was held to be true has vanished. It 
is to this negation of all particularity that every philosopher must 
come: it is the freeing of the spirit, and forms its absolute basis. The 
difference between the latter and the Eleatic philosophy is simply this, 
that, owing to the influence of Christianity in the modern world, there 
is present in the mind generally a more concrete individuality. Not- 
withstanding this infinite demand for the wholly concrete, however, 
substance is not defined as concrete in itself. Inasmuch, therefore, as 
the concrete does not lie in the content of substance, it must fall back 
upon the reflective thinking, and then it is only from the infinite 
antitheses of the latter that the unity results. Of substance as such 
nothing more can be predicated; we can speak only of philosophizing 
concerning it, and of the antitheses cancelled in it. All distinction 
depends simply upon the nature of the antitheses that are cancelled in 
it. Spinoza has been very far from demonstrating this as clearly as 
the ancients took the trouble to do." The two following propositions 
from Spinoza's JEthics will illustrate this : 

Book I. Prop. XIV. JBesides God no substance can be or be conceived. 
Demonstration. Since God is an absolutely infinite Being, of which 
no attribute expressing the essence of substance can be denied, and he 
exists of necessity ; if there were any substance besides God, it would 
have to be explained by some attribute of God, and thus two substan- 
ces having the same attribute would exist, which is absurd. Where- 
fore there can be no substance besides God, and hence none such can 
be conceived. For if it could be conceived, it would necessarily be 
conceived as existing, and this, according to the former part of this 
demonstration, is absurd. Wherefore, besides God, &c. Q. B. D. 

Book II. Prop. I. Thought is an attribute of God, or God is a 
thinking thing. 

17. Simplicius, in commenting upon this passage, says : " We need not 
wonder if he says that the one Being is Hike to the bulk of a well- 
rounded sphere'; for by this figure he merely aims at a sort of mytho- 
logical image." 



Parmenides. 15 

18. Aristotle, Metaph. I, 5, says : u Parmenides seems to speak more 
circumspectly. For laying down Being, and considering ]STot-Being to 
be nothing, he of necessity thinks Being to be one, and nothing eke. 
* * * But being compelled to follow the phenomena, and assuming 
that the One is according to reason, and plurality according to sense, 
he again lays down the two causes and two first principles, hot and 
cold — meaning, for example, fire and earth. The former of these, the 
hot, he arranges on the side of Being, the other on that of Non-Being." 
In the extant fragments of Parmenides there is no mention of heat or 
cold, but only of light and darkness. 

19. The word for circlets "does not occur in the original, but Cicero 
(J)e Naturd Deorum I. 11) tells us : " Parmenides makes a sort of fic- 
tion in the likeness of a crown. He gives it the name of arecpdvq, as 
encircling with a glow of light the sphere which surrounds the heav- 
en, and which he calls God, wherein no one can perceive either divine 
figure or sense." One is almost tempted, in reading this fragment, to 
believe that, according to the view of Parmenides, the sun occupied the 
centre of the material universe, and that the Anima Mundi, or Power 
that governed all thiDgs, was situated in the centre of the sun. There 
is extant a hymn of Proklos To the Sim, of which the opening lines 
may be translated thus : 

" Give ear, O'king of intellectual light; 
Gold-reined Titan, light's Dispenser, hear! 
O king, that holdest in thy hands the key 
Of life's sustaining fount, and from above 
Dost lead throughout the wide material worlds, 
In streams, the brimming fount of harmony, 
Give ear; for, seated on the central throne 
Above the ether, in the fulgent orb, 
The Universe's heart, thou fillest all 
With thine own spirit-waking forward thought. 
The planets, life-lit at thy fadeless torch, 
Forever in their ceaseless and unwearied rounds 
Send life-engendering beams to all on earth, 
While underneath thine ever-circling car, 
By firm decree, the sister seasons spring. 
The din of clashing elements was staid 
When thou appeard'st, sprung from a nameless sire. 
To thee the Fates' unvanquished band gave way, 
And backward twist the thread of destiny 
At thy behest; for thou art mightier far, 
And rnlest mightily with royal power." 

There are many points of resemblance between this poem and the 
fragments of Parmenides, and, as Proklos was well acquainted with 
the work of the latter, we may with some probability suppose that he 
adopted his cosmological views. Erdmann, in his Grundriss der Ge- 



16 Parmenides. 

schichte cler Philosophie,. says : "Parmenides' ideas of the construction 
of the Universe are cither incorrectly handed down, or are unintelli- 
gible from their peculiarity of expression. They did not prevent him 
from having, for his time, important astronomical information." This 
is clear from lines 143-4, which evidently refer to the moon. 

20. This agrees somewhat with Hesiod's statement that Eros (Love) 
was the child of Chaos and Earth. (Theogony, 121.) Compare also 
note 14, and Preller's Griechische Mythologie, Yol. I., p. 393. We 
know also from Aristotle that Parmenides made Love one of the prime 
movers. The other of the two primal causes (afrtac'), mentioned by 
Aristotle, was doubtless Hate, as indeed we are told by Cicero. This, 
again, brings us very close to the doctrine of Empedokles, whose two 
great physical principles are Friendship (^dorvjc) and Strife (wuu?), 
or, as we should say in modern times, attraction and repulsion. 

21. Theophrastos's note on this passage is: "Since there are two 
elements, the cognition is according to the one that prevails ; for, ac- 
cording as the hot or the cold has the upper hand, the thought will 
differ." 

22. The following Latin version of a passage of Parmenides, proba- 
bly connected with this, but no longer extant, occurs in Ccelius Aure- 
lianus De Morb. Chron. IV. 9 : 

"Femina virque simul veneris quum semina miscent 
Venis, infornians diverso ex sanguine virtus, 
Temperieni servans, bene condita corpora fingit; 
At si virtutes permixto semine pugnent 
Nee faciant unam, permixto in corpore dirse 
Nascentetn srenimo vexabunt semine sexum." 



'V 








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- 



E JOURNAL OF SPECULATIVE PHILOSOPHY. 



CONTENTS OF THE FIRST VOLUME. 



Contents of No. 1. 

I. To the Reader. 
II. The Speculative. 

III. Herbert Spencer. 

IV. Introduction to Fichte's Science 

ol Knowledge. 
V. Board's Essay on Hegel's ^Es- 
thetics. 
VI. Raphael's Transfiguration. 
VII. Introduction to Philosophy. 
VIII. Seed Life. 
IX. Schopenhauer on Immortality. 
X. Goethe's Theory of Colors. 



Contents of No. 2. 

I. Second Part of Goethe's Faust. 
II. Fichte's " Criticism of Philoso- 
phical Systems." 

III. Notes on Milton's Lycidas. 

IV. Hegel's Philosophy of Art. 
V. Introduction to Philosophy. 

VI. Music as a Form of Art. 
VII. The Alchemists. 
VI1L Editorials. 



Contents of No. 3. 
I. Translation of Leibnitz's Monad- 
ology. 
II. Fichte's "Criticism of Philosophi- 
cal Systems." 

III. Schelling's "Introduction to Ideal- 

ism." 

IV. Genesis. 

V. Hegel's Philosophy of Art. 
VI. The Metaphysics of Materialism. 
VII. Letters on Faust. 
VIII. Introduction to Philosophy. 
IX. The Philosophy of Baader. 
X. In the Quarry. 

Contents of No. 4. 
I. Schelling's Introduction to the 
Philosophy of Nature. 
II. Hegel's Philosophy of Art (Sculp- 
ture). 

III. Dialogue on Music. 

IV. Schopenhauer's Doctrine of the 

Will. 
V. Introduction to Philosophy. 
VI. A Thought on Shakespeare. 
VII. Goethe's Essay on Da Vinci's 

" Last Supper." 
VIII. Paul Janet and Hegel. 



CONTENTS OF THE SECOND VOLUME. 



I. 

n. 

HI. 

rv. 
v. 

VI. 

VII. 
VIH. 

rx. 
x. 

XI. 



i. 
ii. 

HI. 

rv. 
v. 



CONTENTS OF No. 1. 

Statement of the Problem. 

Fichte's "•Sun-clear Statement." 

Swcdenborg and Speculative Phil- 
osophy. 

Beethoven's Seventh Symphony. 

Hegel's ^Esthetics — Painting. 

Pantheon. 

Introduction to Philosophy. 

The difference of Baader from 
Hegel. 

Nominalism versus Realism. 

Leibnitz on the Nature of the 
Soul. 

Book Notices. 

Contents of No. 2. 

Fichte's "Sun-clear Statement." 

Cousin's Doctrine of the Absolute. 

Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit 
(translated). 

Analysis of Hegel's Phenomenol- 
ogy. 

Questions concerning certain Fac- 
ulties claimed for Man. 

Letters on Faust (second series). 



Contents of No. 3. 
I. Fichte's "Sun-clear Statement.' 
II. Some Consequences of Four Inca-: 
pacities. 

III. Hegel's Philosophy of Art (Music). 

IV. Hegel's. Phenomenology of Spirit 

(translated). 
V. New School of Music. 
VI. Introduction to Philosophy. 
VIL Analysis of Hegel's Phenomenol- 
ogy- 
VIII. TVinckehnann's Remarks on the 
Torso of Hercules. 
IX. The Ideal. 

X. What is Meant by " Determined^ 
XL Intuition vs. Contemplation. 
XII. Book Notice. 

Contents of No. 4. 
I. The Validity of the Lawj 
II. Gothe's and YVInckeh 
marks on the Laokjl 
III. Gothe's Social Romj 
rv. Sankhya Karika (oj 
V. Hegel's Phenoiii 

(translated)^ 
VI. Beethoven's i 
VII. Correspond^ 



\ I 



• oUTsTR 



CONTENTS OF VOLUME Til. 



Contents of No. 1. 
I. New Exposition of the Science of 
Knowledge, by Ficlite. 
II. Bernard's Analysis of Hegel's -<Es- 
thetics (Poetry). 

III. The Sentences of Porphyry the 

Philosopher. 

IV. Michael Angelo's " Last Judgment." 
V. Leibnitz on Platonic Enthusiasm. 

VI. A National Institute. 
VII. Winckelmann's Description of the 
Apollo Belvedere. 



n, 
in. 

IV 

V. 

VI. 

VII. 

VIII. 



Contents of No. 2. 

New Exposition of the Science of 
Knowledge, by Fichte. 

Kant's System of Transcendental- 
ism. 

B^nard's Analysis of Hegel's ^Es- 
thetics- (Poetry). 

Outlines of Hegel's Phenomenology. 

The Speculative vs. the Visionary. 

" He is not Far." 

Elementary School Education. 

Practical Effects of Modern Philoso- 
phy. 



Contents of No. 3. 

I. New Exposition of the Science of 
Knowledge, by Fichte. 
II. Kant's System of Transcendental- 
ism. 

III. Outlines of Hegel's Logic. 

IV. B^nard's Analysis of Hegel's ^Es- 

thetics. 

V. The True First Principle. 



Contents of No. 4. 

I. New Exposition of the Science of 

Knowledge, by Fichte. 
II. Be"nard's Analysis of Hegel's 2Es- 
thetics. 

III. Berkeley's Doctrine on the Nature of 

Matter. 

IV. Hegel's First Principle. 

V. The Problems of Philosophy at the 
Present Time. 
VI. Is Thought the Thinker ? 
VII. Preface to Vol. III. 






